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Justice refers to the ethical category of the existing,  
virtue the ethical category of the demanded.  
 
Walter Benjamin: Notes to a Work on the Category of Justice 
 
 
If there is a predicament, one in which ‘we’ are – one in which this 
‘we’ is understood as designating a relationship between forms of 
experience and therefore both subjectivity and a sense of historical time, 
where time is there to be thought philosophically - then what arises as a 
concern to be addressed pertains to the categories or concepts in which this 
predicament is to be thought.1 The present demands to be thought. What is 
central to the philosophical project is how to distinguish between differing 
and conflicting correlations. However, it is the ineliminability of thought 
that generates the following opening question: What are the categories, the 
modes of thought appropriate to the predicament in which ‘we’ are and 
thus in which ‘we’ take a stand? Though it should always be noted that this 
‘we’ is itself the site of an already present asymmetrical relation between 
the ‘we’ that is held as a yet-to-be determined potentiality and the ‘we’ 
whose overdetermined presence is assumed as simply given by a certain 
conception of both law and politics.  The latter is the ‘we’ of a posited and 
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then naturalized normativity, while the former is the ‘we’ that is always 
there as the sense of collectivity – community and subjectivity – resulting 
both from this exposure and the undoing of processes of naturalization; 
hence, the undoing of normativity in the name of an-other possibility. 
Within the present predicament in which predicament as praedicamentum 
names the state or the condition, thus the categories in terms of which 
what is, is presented and constrains thought, that constraint, thus the 
constrained, involves, at the same time, as much an appeal to the logical 
and to reason as it does to the understanding. There is, moreover, an 
inevitable link to praedicare and thus to stating or declaring. The 
predicament can be stated. There is a condition which in conditioning leads 
to forms of utterance and thus to speech. Without understating the 
predicament, in other words, without thinking thinking’s own predicament, 
thought is refused an address; equally, thought would have failed to 
address. As a point of departure therefore it becomes possible to ask the 
question of the predicament within which Aristotle may have responded to 
the demand to think; questions of this nature pertain, equally, to Arendt. 
While she may have engaged with Aristotle and thus with Ancient thought 
more generally, that engagement was set by the predicament constraining 
thought. Borrowings and engagements will have always been determined in 
advance by their own predicament.  
 
1. 
 
Life as understood by Aristotle bequeaths a number of problems. The 
one that is of direct concern in this instance is the relationship between 
‘life’ and ‘the good life.’ How is such a distinction to be understood? What 
type of distinction is it? These questions are to be approached here initially 
in terms of the temporality of eudaimonia and thus, equally, of the position 
of the eudaimon. Once this position can be generalised it indicates the 
presence of a founding reciprocity between time, and the ontology of being 
a subject. This point arises in Arendt’s engagement with Aristotle’s use of 
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the terms ‘eudaimon’ and ‘eudaimonia.’ In this regard she argues the 
following: 
 
To be eudaimon and to have been eudaimon, according to Aristotle, 
are the  same, just as to live well (εὖ ζῇ) and to have ‘lived well’ are 
the same as  long as life lasts; they are not states or activities which change 
a person’s  quality, such as learning and having learned, which indicates 
two altogether  different attributes of the same person at different 
times.2 
 
‘Learning’ and ‘having learned’ have beginnings and ends. If there is a 
capacity to learn then its actualization is ‘having learned.’ Arendt’s claim is 
that for Aristotle being a eudaimon is importantly different. In making this 
point her reference is, of course, to the discussion of what can be described 
as the modal identity of ‘living well’ and to ‘have lived well’ as it is 
presented in Metaphysics 1048b25. The significant elements of the passage 
read as follows: 
 
We are living well and have lived well, we are happy and have been 
happy, at the same time [εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ 
εὐδαιμόνηκεν] otherwise the process would have had to cease at 
some time . . . but it has not ceased at the present moment; we both 
are living and have lived [ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν].3 
 
Eudaimonia, at least in its first iteration here, is the predicate of a 
subject.4 However, two issues arise here:  the first concerns coming to live 
well and the production of the subject as the eudaimon and therefore 
secondly the problem of who is the subject of eudaimonia given that this 
subject position is produced. Here, the important point is that eudaimonia 
is the telos of life and thus that which orientates life. The formulation of 
this position in the Nichomachean Ethics is clear: 
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The good life, therefore, appearing as something final and self-
sufficient, is the end to which all actions aim [τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται 
καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος].5 
 
While the argument that life takes as its end the life that is lived properly 
(where the sense of propriety is set by life itself and is thus intrinsic to life, 
hence value is not external) and while it is also possible to identify the 
qualities of that life, the question that endures is on one level what 
occasions the move from life to ‘the good life’; implicit in that demand 
however is another: namely, what would it mean here to participate in life? 
The second question has to wait. In regards to the first, however, part of 
the answer depends upon the capacity of logos – understood as both reason 
and speech - to identify and thus to articulate the presence of this position. 
What is proper to life is shown – ‘manifested’ - by logos. Hence the claim in 
the Politics that, 
 
Logos makes manifest (shows) the beneficial and the harmful’ [ὁ δὲ 
λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν].6 
 
Recognizing that the ‘beneficial’ and the ‘harmful’ pertain to life in its 
unfolding, in other words they pertain to life in its being lived, means that, 
as a consequence, understanding the force of Aristotle’s position hinges on 
what ‘showing’ or ‘manifesting’ mean in this instance. To argue that 
eudaimonia is the telos of life is to make the claim for which the following 
argument can be adduced: namely, that the ontology of being human has to 
be explained in terms of the living out of that which is proper to the being 
of being human. There can be therefore no founding separation of the 
ontological and the teleological. The latter is the former’s unfolding. 
Consequently, though it will be important to return to this point since what 
will emerge is the necessity to incorporate a founding division such that the 
distinction between potentiality and actuality marks an ontological divide, 
at this stage the founding interarticulation of the ontological and the 
teleological provides the framework within which to understand the famous 
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claim made in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics concerning the 
description of the being of being human: “the human, in terms of its being, 
is a political animal” [ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον].”7  What is 
identified here is the originality of what can be called being-in-place.8 The 
human, in virtue of being human, is polis dwelling, and therefore for 
Aristotle what can be described as placedness is an already present quality 
of human being. Moreover, it is placedness that human beings have in 
common. Indeed, if the detail of Aristotle’s own argument is followed there 
is an extension from being-in-place to being-in-common. They are mutually 
reinforcing. Their interconnection delimits the always already present status 
and condition of human being and needs to be understood, not only as that 
which delimits the being of being human, but that such a setting also marks 
how the already present interarticulation of the ontological and the 
teleological is to be understood. They are combined insofar as being human 
is the living out of being-in-place (a position that reoccurs in Arendt in 
terms of the indispensability of the ‘space of appearance’ as the space of 
human being.9) However, there is a fundamental caveat here, one that will 
have a determining effect on the argumentation to come. The caveat 
pertains to what Aristotle has already recognised in regards to a general 
understanding of the power of any capacity or potentiality (dynamis). The 
claim is that every dynamis is linked to a contrary adynamis. The 
formulation is the following: 
 
 Incapacity and the incapable [ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον] is the 
 privation contrary to capacity [δυνάμει] in this sense; so that every 
 ‘capacity’ has a contrary incapacity [τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ] 
for  producing the same result in respect of the same subject.10  
 
This general position opens up what might be described as the problem of 
the contingency of actualization. The necessity of contingency is a state of 
affairs that arises precisely because of the always already present nature of 
adynamis. Specifically, what this means here is that it does not follow from 
the necessity of identifying that which is proper to human being, which is to 
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say the grounding of ‘the good life’ in the being of being human, that it has 
to be actualised as such. Virtue for Aristotle is ‘a state of potentiality.’11 
And yet the problem of actualization will continue to haunt Aristotle’s 
engagement with the complex relationship between potentiality and ‘self-
sufficiency.’ Nonetheless, it is precisely the necessity of the founding 
ontological configuration and the inscription of the teleological within it – 
even knowing that actualization has an inevitable contingency – that guides 
the assessment of the lived life as ‘the good life.’ The guide emerges since 
life as lived cannot be separated either from this initial description of the 
being of being human, or from the necessity that the human life has to be 
lived out within the setting created by that which defines human being, 
namely the polis (the latter, again, as the place of human being). What 
logos makes clear therefore, or at least this would be the argument, is the 
current state of either individual or communal being as it is defined by the 
living out of the ‘good life.’ 
 
Having created this setting the question that arises is the following: 
What does it mean to claim that ‘the good life’ (εὐδαιμονία), working on the 
basis that it provides life with its telos, is ‘self-sufficient’ (αὔταρκες)? 
(Given that this is the claim of Nichomachean Ethics 1098a8.) Taken more 
generally, what is at stake here can be understood as having a fundamental 
commensurability with the problem of actuality and thus of actualization 
(and then with the production of the subject as the eudaimon). If ‘the good 
life’ is a telos, and if it is recognized that ‘the good life’ is not an endpoint 
but is inextricably bound up with life as lived, then self-sufficiency becomes 
the possibility, where possibility and inevitability coincide, of the continual 
actualization of the telos of life. Within this setting the success of a life 
being ‘the good life’ is a proposition that can be assessed in terms of the 
criteria yielded by life as that which is – is what it is - in its being lived out. 
In sum, it is only possible to be self-sufficient within a setting in which 
eudaimonia is ‘self-sufficient.’12 However, an addition needs to be made 
here since this position in the argumentation of the passage is immediately 
qualified. (A qualification that marks the introduction in the text of the 
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Nicomachean Ethics of the position noted above that human being is being-
in-place.) The qualification is that ‘self-sufficiency’ does not pertain to a 
‘life lived in isolation’ but to a life lived within a complex network of 
relations. This is the life afforded by logos. What then of the claim of ‘self-
sufficiency’ knowing that it is not the project of any one individual subject, 
if that subject position were taken as an end in itself, but rather of a 
subject inscribed within the always already present set of relations that 
define human being as being-in-place and being-in-common? In other words, 
what arises once it has to be assumed that both place and commonality are 
at work? They produce the subject. As a result that subject then lives out 
that production as a placed entity.13 
 
At a slightly later stage in his engagement with ‘the good life’ (and 
formulations that have a similar extension) Aristotle links ‘the good life’ and 
‘virtue’ (aretê). The significance of the connection is that it opens up, once 
again, actualization as a problem. While it is possible to account for the 
presence of virtue where that presence is not enacted, such a state of 
affairs would be the exception. In a complex formulation of what is 
intended to counter any possible account of virtue in which virtue was 
characterized by its presence as a mere disposition, Aristotle writes of 
virtue that it, 
 
in active exercise cannot be inoperative – it will of necessity act and 
act well [τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε: πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ 
πράξει].14 
 
Again there is a similar structure. Virtue is such that it is in its being acted 
out. Virtuous activity allows for the identification of praxis and eupraxia. It 
cannot be that which is other than what is there in its being acted out. 
Hence ‘acting’ and ‘acting well’ do not lend themselves to any form of 
radical disassociation. Indeed it can be argued that in the formulation in 
Metaphysics 1048b25 – “We are living well and have lived well, we are 
happy and have been happy, at the same time [εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ 
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εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν]” – the temporal marker ἅμα sustains the 
position that there is a temporal continuity rather than a disjunction that 
would have demanded the actualization of ‘living well’ or ‘the good life.’ 
There is a sense of what can be termed at-the-same-timeness that enforces 
continuity rather than allowing for the staging of a discontinuity.15 As will 
emerge it is the presence of an opening marking the move from potentiality 
to actuality that demands a reconfiguration of at-the-same-timeness. Within 
the immediate context of Aristotle’s presentation of virtue however, the 
latter, once present, will continue to present itself.  Virtue’s potentiality 
becomes its actuality. This is what virtue’s self-sufficiency would be. There 
is an essential additional point here that indicates that what is operative is 
both virtue and ‘the good life.’ Logos becomes that in relation to which 
self-sufficiency, once set within the structure of at-the-same-timeness, is 
staged. As part of a discussion of Politics 1253a 14-15 Adriel Trott writes 
that it is in 
 
logos we make what is good for us what life is the good life, 
apparent. We cannot understand what this is before we work it out 
with others.16 
 
While this is right insofar as it correctly assumes that ‘the good life’ is a 
project that is inherently relational a problem still persists.  It arises 
because of the conditions in relation to which it is, or is not, possible to 
participate with others.  
 
The problem does not inhere in the accuracy of Trott’s description of 
Aristotle. Rather the problem can best be positioned in terms of a 
distinction between, in the first instance, an agonistic sense of relation in 
which deliberation and judgement have a regulative force, and then in the 
second, a form of relationality defined in terms of fundamental disequilibria 
of power. With the latter the presence of power relations have an effect on 
relationality and thus participation in decision making. Rationality may 
allow for a sense of negotiation in which it is possible to sustain a sense of 
 9 
concord in which differences are lived out. Equally, however, rationality 
may define contestation within power relations in which the possibility of 
concord is impossible as a result of the exclusion from what Arendt would 
call the ‘space of appearance’ of those between whom concord would need 
to obtain.17 Hence the twofold claim made in the Nichomachean Ethics that, 
in the first instance, “the good life” is the “end of human life” and that ‘it 
consists in activity in accordance with virtue.”18 At work in both of these 
interrelated formulations there is the reiterated presence of abstract human 
life. And yet there is another conception of life.  This is the life that is not 
life, a conception that is made clear in Aristotle’s claim that “no one allows 
a slave any measure of the good life, any more than a life of his own.”19 The 
formulation is precise. The slave is allowed a relation of pleasure to the 
body but not a relation to life: εἰ μὴ …βίου. Hence, as a result of this 
separation, bodily life – the life of the body – is not life. This is of course a 
position that is presented with equal clarity in the Politics in which slaves 
are linked to “lower animals” and “do not participate in the good life or a 
deliberative life [νῦν δ᾽οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν 
κατὰ προαίρεσιν].”20 The use of the Platonic formulation of ‘participation’ 
(μετέχειν) as that which provides identity should be noted. Participating ‘in 
life’ (τοῦ ζῆν) would yield the one participating in it as alive. Hence while 
bodily, indeed it is the slave’s body which allow it to function as ‘living 
labour,’ the slave is not to be identified as alive and thus as living a life. 
The slave is excised. The significant point here however is that the 
distinction within life in which the slave as alive does not ‘participate’ in 
life would itself have both secured and maintained by logos. It is in terms of 
logos that the slave comes to be described. Logos secures the distinction 
within life hence logos would have been essential to the production of the 
slave is aneu logon. As Arendt notes the slave is, 
 
deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life 
in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central 
concern of all citizens was to talk with each other.21 
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Having a body the slave still speaks. And yet, of course, logos is that which 
serves to secure the slave’s non-relation to logos. In other words, this 
means that logos cannot be taken as end in itself. And it is precisely this 
particular identification of the limit of logos that opens what might be 
called the problem of authority. Logos can no longer function as that which 
guarantees acts that have, or should have, a singular status. The 
consequence is that the ground of authority can no longer be assumed by 
that which is held in place by ‘self-sufficiency’ as secured by this specific 
instance of the temporality of at-the-same-timeness.  
 
There is an additional point that needs to be made. The result of 
limiting logos in this way is that it undermines the possibility of ‘self-
sufficiency’ if the latter is taken as a given rather than as produced. Once 
produced, of course, then ‘self-sufficiency’ is the after-effect of a founding 
site of difference, citizen/slave for example, that is itself the locus of an 
original differential of power. While a return will be made to the 
formulation concerning the interplay between the production of subject 
positions and power, it is essential in this regard to note the description of 
the slave as outside a life that takes place κατὰ προαίρεσιν  namely, it 
occurs outside a life lived ‘according to deliberation’. The consequence of 
such a position is that the slave cannot act virtuously in the strict sense of 
the term in which virtue is the result of deliberation. Hence, the slave 
cannot participate in the realm of deliberation and decision making that 
was itself regulated by logos.22 As has been argued there is a structuring 
effect, namely the creation here of a position in which logos works to 
exclude the slave from relations that are defined by logos. 
 
More generally therefore the claim is not that virtue and ‘the good 
life’ preclude any form of self-definition, it is rather that their actualization 
cannot be assumed since what restricts the actualization of that potentiality 
is external to the structure of self-sufficiency. If this is the case then a 
fundamental result of such a state of affairs is that the absence of a modal 
distinction between life and ‘the good life’ would then have to be taken up. 
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The actualization of ‘the good life’ now acquires a contingency that 
complicates in advance the nature of the interconnection between the 
ontological and the teleological. Indeed, the position to be sketched out in 
what follows is that the problem of contingency, in being recast, opens up 
the needs for an inscription of a genuine modal (now understood as both 
temporal and ontological) distinction between potentiality and actuality 
such that it is the structure of that distinction that will allow for a way of 
addressing the problem of authority that Arendt uncovers though which, it 
can be argued, her work is unable to resolve. It is essential to be precise 
here in terms of the limits of Aristotle. Arendt accepts, with justification, 
the identification of the being of being human with being-in-place, evidence 
for which is in part provided by a reformulation of Kant in which humans 
become “earthbound creatures.”23 However, the Aristotelian extension of 
this position is linked to a conception of ‘self-sufficiency’ that cannot be 
sustained for two reasons.  
 
The first that it is a produced state and thus the link between self-
sufficiency, eudaimonia and life is predicated on a setting in which the 
absence of that interconnection in the life of another, or the possibility of 
excluding them from it, means that the restriction of potentiality has an 
external ground that results in the refusal of self-sufficiency. The second 
reason for the impossibility of ‘self-sufficiency’ is that what modernity 
discovers – a discovery in which the moderns’ predicament is itself disclosed 
- is that the possibility of deliberation that is central to Aristotle and which 
structured the move from ‘life’ to the ‘good’ life is no longer available if 
the locus of deliberation is taken to be a produced form of collectivity that 
is itself dependent upon modes of exclusion. Hence, the Aristotelian 
conceptions of being-in-place and being-in-common while formally correct 
come undone once there is a move from the formal determination to its 
determined and thus particular enactment or realization. To be effective 
therefore these conceptions have to remain immanent and thus are present 
as the ground of judgement. ‘Self-sufficiency’ as traditionally conceived 
precisely because it is produced cannot account for the inscription of power 
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into being-in-place; moreover, already present forms of relationality make 
the actualization of ‘the good life’ fundamentally more complex than had 
been first envisaged. Logos fails if it is positioned outside the realm of the 
differential. However, the Aristotelian point of departure which involves 
accepting a specific definition of the being of being human, and 
furthermore the interarticulation of ontology and teleology once recast in 
terms of the problem of how a potentiality is actualized rather than 
actualization having to be assumed, when taken together, provide a way 
ahead. There is a further point that can be made here. ‘Self-sufficiency’ is 
the predicate of a subject. As such it assumed the sovereignty of the 
subject. Once such a position is allowed then the exclusion of the slave is 
the refusal to grant the slave sovereignty. However, if this were taken as 
the end point, one resolved by extending rights to the slave and thus 
presenting the philosophical problem raised by the slave in terms of 
individual autonomy, then it would have misconstrued what is at work.  
Moreover, the force of being–in-place and being-in-common would also have 
been misconstrued. What both name as well as demand is the primacy of 
relationality. Hence what slavery sustains is the retained elimination of the 
slave from any active position within relationality. Consequently, while the 
slave is ‘living’ (ἔμψυχον) – Politics 1253b 30 - the slave, as has already 
been indicated, does not ‘participate’ in life. What this opens up is the 
need to move from the sovereignty of the subject to the sovereignty of the 
relation. It is important to note that the possibility of attributing 
sovereignty to the relation is already there in Arendt. In The Human 
Condition she notes that, 
 
the Romans, perhaps the most political people we have known, used 
the words “to live” and “to be among men” (inter homines esse) … as 
synonyms.24 
 
The force of Arendt’s position emerges once what is taken as central in the 
formulation ‘inter homines esse’ is the ‘inter’ rather than those between 
whom relationality obtains. Even though its initial formulation can be 
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located in Aristotle the locus of sovereignty has shifted fundamentally in 
this presentation of the move from Greece to Rome. 
 
2. 
 
Though its pathos would only ever emerge retrospectively, the closing 
lines of Arendt’s The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition evince an acuity of 
thought whose registration is still to be taken up. Only within what she 
describes in that particular work as ‘the framework of a people’ is it 
possible to live as a human being without that being as human becoming 
exhausted in the process, remembering that for her Kafka’s K dies 
‘exhausted.’25 She concludes the text thus: 
 
And only when a people lives and functions in consort with other 
peoples can it contribute to the establishment on earth of a 
commonly conditioned and commonly controlled humanity.26 
 
The terms guiding this conclusion are decisive. There is the possibility of 
acting in ‘consort.’ It is however only a possibility. Nonetheless, as a 
possibility it is able to maintain a specific identity. Her conclusion, 
moreover, stages the need for a specific philosophical project. That need 
arises, for Arendt, from thought’s own predicament. Relationality returns 
since the reference to the possibility of being in ‘consort’ functions as 
providing a link to the ‘common.’ It also underscores the centrality of 
relationality, which, as has been noted above, underscores the sovereignty 
of the ‘inter.’ The initial question is therefore: What does it mean to live 
and function in ‘consort.’ In sum what is being-in-consort? The difficulty 
arising from such a demand is clear from the start; that difficulty inheres in 
the distinction between living in consort, thus being-in-consort, as a claim, 
a claim with either a positive or negative determination, and both the 
possibility of living in consort as well as the capacity so to do. The problem 
of the nature of the connection between potentiality and actuality that has 
already been noted is therefore recalled. Living in consort as a potentiality 
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is not undone as a result of its present, thus actual, impossibility. (It is 
precisely the inscription of a form of contingency, the contingency whose 
condition of possibility is the necessity of being-in-place and being-in-
common, which renders inoperative the Aristotelian conception of at-the-
same-timeness since within what is named as ‘living in consort’ there is a 
disjunction at the center of the relation. As a result what is there at-the-
same-time is that disjunctive relation.) Again, not only is there a clear 
modal distinction, there is now also an ontological one. In sum what this 
means is that while living in consort, i.e. being-in-common, is there as a 
potentiality that attends the actuality of human life, its force does not 
depend upon its actualization. As a result, its presence as a potentiality, 
and therefore as the unconditioned itself, has then to be thought. The 
exigency that pertains here is not unique. On the contrary, it is the problem 
that attends any evocation of potentiality, i.e. the non-necessity of 
actualisation opens up as a problem how actualization is to occur. In this 
context this has a specific consequence, namely, that there is an important 
distinction between actual life and a potentiality where the latter is 
immanent within life. Immanence is a form of presence. To recall the 
position to which an implicit allusion has already been made, this modal and 
ontological distinction is of a genuine significance as it institutes a space, a 
breach that yields the ground of judgement and equally is any one 
judgment’s condition of possibility. This is the point at which there is both 
an allusion to Aristotle and a genuine departure.27 (Though this position, as 
will be seen, is inherently more complex.)  
 
Judgment within such a setting can occur precisely because what is 
designated by the possibility of living in consort is yet to attain actuality. 
The opening that is signalled by the presence of that which is yet to occur 
allows for judgment because it defines the locus in which the demand for 
judgment is situated. In addition, and the addition will prove decisive, once 
it can be argued that the potentiality awaits actualization, then what has to 
be addressed is not just the question of how the relationship between 
potentiality and actuality is to be understood but what the actualization of 
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a potentiality actually entails. 28 The possibility of what now can be 
described, following Arendt, as living-in-consort can only be understood 
adequately if it is understood as a potentiality that is itself positioned 
between naturalized normativity on the one hand and, on the other, 
whatever it is that endures as the ‘other’ possibility. What demands to be 
thought therefore is the presence of living-in-consort as a potentiality 
whose necessity, which here is the necessity of presence (presence as 
immanence) and not the necessity of actualization – is grounded in an 
ontological claim about the being of being human. Guiding this thinking is 
the already noted modal distinction and the founding breach that the 
identification of living-in-consort has evoked. There is a further 
consideration that should be added here. Namely, that what is identified is 
a mode of living in which identity and thus either individual or group 
freedom is relational and acted out such that identity would then become 
the lived out presence of differences. Identity is associated with a set of 
claims that links freedom to non-universalizability in the precise sense that 
being-in-consort necessitates the retained set of connections between 
identities in relation to which consort then pertains as a possibility. Non-
universalizability is the retention of particularity within living-in-consort. 
Non-universalizability is the minimal condition for particularity. What has to 
be staged therefore is the possibility of living-in-consort which is the 
articulation of the necessity for a reformulation of the relation between 
universal and particular in terms of indetermination.29 Present here is a 
setup that is itself located within the distinction between potentiality and 
actuality such that it does follow from the non-actualization of living-in-
consort that it cannot function as a form of potentiality that sets, at the 
same time, the conditions for the actual’s judgment. (At work within it 
therefore is a fundamental shift in how at-the-same-timeness is to be 
conceived; from the conjunctive to the disjunctive.) Indeed, while it might 
be suggested that moving away from Aristotle demands that judgment is 
possible as a result of the way the distinction between the potential and the 
actual has been repositioned, as will emerge at a later stage, part of the 
argument will be that Aristotle’s own engagement with ‘political justice’ 
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demands the exact same reconsideration of the relation between potential 
and actual existence is terms of immanence and the disjunctive. Despite the 
difficulties already encountered in Aristotle the way the distinction between 
physis and nomos is presented in his formulation of ‘political justice’ 
demands that this conception of justice be thought in terms of the 
distinction between the unconditioned and the conditioned. 
 
While there is a necessity that attends living-in-consort insofar it is a 
continual prompt for thought, in the context of Arendt’s writings that 
prompt does not exist in isolation. Rather, it is coterminous with that form 
of exigency, which, for Arendt, arises from the presence of a historical 
occurrence. The demand that such an occurrence sets in play for thought 
opens in a certain direction. The demand here is integral to the constitution 
of such occurrences as events. (The event is the historical occurrence 
thought philosophically.) In this instance it is the task that occurs once 
there has been the recognition of the determining effect of totalitarianism. 
Here is the first real intimation of the predicament of thought. In the First 
Preface to The Origins of Totalitarianism she argues that as a result of the 
totalitarian what has been ‘demonstrated’ is, 
 
that human dignity needs a new guarantee  which can be found only 
in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this 
time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must 
remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined 
territorial entities.30 
 
If this passage were read not merely as a pragmatic claim but within the 
framework created by the way the universal and the particular occurs 
within it, i.e. a framework held in play by the relationship between the 
‘whole of humanity’ on the one hand and the ‘limited’ on the other, then a 
specific interpretative challenge emerges. The problem to be investigated 
involves a twofold set of connections. The first is between, in the first 
instance, the presence of a ‘new political principle,’ a ‘principle’ that 
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would need to be held as a ‘new law on earth,’ and thus as a law of the 
earth. Here is the presence of law founding. The founding of law occurs 
even if that law (now as founded) is then delimited by specificity and the 
locus of which would always be the presence of specific political 
considerations. Hence, the second set of connections concerns the interplay 
of action and judgment.31  
 
Again, it is essential to take Arendt’s formulation carefully. Note that 
she argues for the presence of ‘human dignity’ as that which needs a ‘new 
guarantee.’ The need for such a ‘guarantee’ is not arbitrary. On the 
contrary, it comes from the fracturing of the identification of the subject of 
right with the citizen such that what has to be investigated is another way 
of thinking the nature of the relationship between right and the citizen 
though now where the latter is recast as the human subject given within the 
setting in which the ‘inter’ delimits human being. The refugee occasions; 
what is occasioned however cannot be found in the pragmatic. There needs 
to be an ontological configuration in which ‘dignity’ is not a contingent 
predicate of human being. Rather, the claim has to be that dignity is 
coterminous with the being of being human. Here is the opening of the link 
to Aristotle, or at least the reiteration of the Aristotelian insistence that 
what is proper to human being has to be thought in terms of physis and thus 
in terms of the being of being human. And yet, and here is the move away 
from Aristotle, this is a moving away that takes his configuration of human 
being into the contemporary. This other move has to occur because dignity 
has become precarious. It is precisely not self-sufficient. Indeed, dignity can 
now be seen as having been precarious from the start. There is no necessity 
for the presence of dignity to be actualized as such. Humans enslave other 
humans. Humans impoverish other humans. In both instances participation 
in the life that holds open ‘the good life’ has a potentiality that has either 
been annulled or radically diminished. Within the Greek context slaves were 
denied human dignity precisely because of the separation of the slave from 
‘life.’ They were denied the possibility of the actualization of that which is 
proper to human being i.e. being-in-place and being-in-common. As such 
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they were, to deploy Walter Benjamin’s category, ‘mere life’ (das bloße 
Leben), or Arendt’s term, ‘mere existence,’ and yet despite what could now 
be understood as the need for such a category, it was unavailable to 
Aristotle.32 Even though Aristotle argues in the Politics (1280a31) that a 
“polis exists for the sake of ‘the good life’ and not for the sake of life,” the 
life that is opposed to ‘the good life’ is not a sense of ‘mere life’ where the 
latter is either a produced state or a yet-to-be actualized potentiality. In 
other words, for Aristotle life in its opposition to ‘the good life’ is not a 
conception of life that would have been defined by a sense of a radical and 
sustained exclusion from the sense of life that can become ‘the good life.’ 
The movement between them, the move from ‘life’ to ‘the good life,’ for 
Aristotle, is simply developmental. The slave, by definition, is excluded 
from the structure of the developmental itself. 
 
It is within this context that slaves could not be seen as that which 
would have checked virtue’s self-sufficiency. As has already been noted, 
slaves whilst human were not able to be virtuous in ways that linked them 
to life. They did not lead a life resulting from deliberation. This is the force 
of the formulation τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, a formulation which identifies 
that from which they were excluded, deliberation itself, which is a setting 
where both logos and the inbuilt sense of relationality that it assumes 
remain integral elements. To deliberate is to act in accord with others. 
Hence, the power of the formulation that what relationality means for 
Aristotle is communal life and thus not “living a life of isolation [τῷ ζῶντι 
βίον μονώτην].”33 Now, the presence of dignity as inseparable from what 
always already pertains to human being needs to be understood as an 
immanent potentiality that allows action to endure within a locus of 
judgement because actions occur in the opening created by the disjunction 
between the potential and the actual. The key point however is that the 
elements comprising this disjunctive relation hold at-the-same-time. What 
this means is that judgment takes virtue’s non-self-sufficiency as axiomatic.  
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The direct question that arises from Arendt’s formulation is clear: To 
what does ‘human dignity’ refer? In order to make the claim specific the 
argument is going to be that ‘human dignity’ names that setup that is 
identified at a much later stage in The Origins of Totalitarianism as ‘the 
right to have rights.’34 What is significant is how this original right – the 
right that will henceforth be understood as naming the incorporation of 
dignity into human being - is discovered. It arises from a specific sense of 
orientation, and thus the determination of what sustains an effective and 
effecting hold on the contemporary, namely what counts as ‘our’ 
predicament. She writes that the awareness of 
 
the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a 
framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a 
right to belong to some kind of organic community, only when 
millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these 
rights because of a new global situation.35 
 
There is a clear divide between rights and the right to have them. The 
problem that arises here does not concern the presence of a divide yielding 
two senses of right. On the contrary, what endures as problematic is how 
the divide is to be thought. The philosophical task therefore is different. 
The predicament is different. Consequently, its registration involves the 
thinking of that difference. What this entails here is that in order to avoid a 
possible infinite regress in which one right would be dependent upon an 
earlier one, what has to be maintained is the qualitative distinction 
between these two different loci of rights. However, a setting needs to be 
identified. The setting is provided by a return once more to authority. 
 
From Arendt’s perspective the problem of authority is clear. 
Authority has gone.  Its power lay in what it was. If there were a form of 
retention of what might be described as authority’s authority, then it could 
be noted in moments of foundation and thus in the practices of revolution. 
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Of these revolutions Ardent writes the following. They are the lines that 
bring her extended investigation of  ‘authority’ to a close. 
 
They seem to be the only salvation, which this Roman-western 
tradition has provided for emergencies. The fact that not only the 
various revolutions of the twentieth century but all the revolutions 
since the French have gone wrong, ending in either restoration or 
tyranny, seems to indicate that even the last means of salvation 
provided by tradition have become inadequate. Authority as we once 
knew it, which grew out of the Roman experience of foundation, and 
was understood in the light of Greek political philosophy, has 
nowhere been re-established either through revolutions or through 
the even less promising means of restoration, and least of all through 
the conservative moods and trends which occasionally sweep public 
opinion. For to live in a political realm with neither authority nor the 
concomitant awareness that the source of authority transcends power 
and those who are in power, means to be confronted anew, without 
the religious trust in a scared beginning and without the protection of 
traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behaviour, by the 
elementary problem of human living-together.36 
 
Questions arise. To begin: What is this ‘confrontation’? What, moreover, 
would the structure of recognition demanded by such a ‘confrontation’ and 
its taking place, were it to take place ‘anew,’ actually be? The absence of 
religion is not the absence of an epistemological framework in which the 
presence, as known, of a deity would have functioned. Religion, in Arendt’s 
use of the term, needs to be understood in relation to her own evocation of 
the Latin root in which religion is religare.  The absence of religion is a form 
of presence; i.e. the presence of a maintained unbinding. The language of 
‘confrontation,’ once set within the context both of an ineliminable 
unbinding and, it might be conjectured, of the naturalization of that 
setting, when taken together entail not that the problem of authority 
cannot be addressed in terms of the setting from which it arises; since 
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differing modes of naturalization create the problem they do not provide a 
way out. As a result there would have to be a denaturing of nature were 
there to be a way through.  Arising therefore as part of the process would 
be another conception of nature; a conception that opens up the possible 
move from the interplay of myth and fate and towards history. What follows 
from this description is that the way into the problem of authority, were 
Arendt’s opening to be pursued, would lie in taking seriously her claim that 
“the source of authority transcends power and those who are in power” 
(emphasis added). Hence, her description that ‘power’ cannot be thought 
simply in terms of specific modes of actualization. Power “enables,” rather 
than being a “means to an end.”37 Power is pure. Affirming the primacy of 
the Arendtian conception of power entails that the dominance of the 
instrumental or the calculable would have been subdued. The non-
instrumentality of power locates it in a relation of indetermination to 
specific acts. Authority has to be thought in connection to this conception of 
power. (Hence the fundamental separation of power and violence.38) The 
problematic presence of authority becomes the question, and it might be 
added the possibility of the non-instrumental utility, of ‘transcendence.’ It 
should be noted however that she deploys the notion of transcendence in a 
very specific way elsewhere. In “Philosophy and Sociology” transcendence 
comes to be identified as “crucial to the concept of brotherly love in early 
Christianity.”39 What underpins that configuration is described in the 
following terms as, 
 
the possibility of living in the world but being guided by a 
transcendence that does not conceive of itself as realizable on earth 
(eschatological consciousness).40  
 
The problem that arises in this context concerns the possibility of a 
different conception of ‘transcendence.’ While what is at stake in the above 
formulation links transcendence to the realm of ‘early Christianity,’ what is 
of interest is the possibility of a rearticulation of transcendence within the 
terms that are set by the dynamic opposition between the actual and the 
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potential. It will be a rearticulation in which the ‘earth’ figures. 
Transcendence, though this is the challenge that is posed, will become a 
quality of the earth. (Transcendence is of the world, not from it.) This 
accounts for the nature of her critique of Plato. The earth and the world 
have to remain. In Between Past and Future, Plato’s stance is presented as 
fundamentally discontinuous with the world. Her claim is that,  
 
Plato’s truth, found and actualized in solitude, transcends, by 
definition, the realm of the many, the world of human affairs.41  
 
The question that emerges is clear: While Arendt’s project necessitates the 
retention of a distinction between potentiality and actuality, where the 
former is defined as immanent or transcendent and is present in its 
irreparable divide from the actual as the ground of judgement, are there 
the resources within her philosophical project to think what the project 
itself demands?42 It should be noted that the irreparable divide is imposed 
as much by the philosophical tradition that is constituted by a fundamental 
distinction between the unconditioned and the conditioned, on the one 
hand, as it is by the presence of that division as a result of the demand 
made by the presence of the totalitarian – and its consequences - once the 
latter is constituted as an event for philosophy, on the other. The argument 
has to be that dignity, as a ‘new political principle,’ needs to be 
unconditioned in relation to any conditioned for it to be ‘a new law on the 
earth.’  The unconditioned and the conditioned have to be present at-the-
same-time. Again there is a furthering of at-the-same-timeness thought in 
terms of disjunction in which that latter quality is what allows, in any one 
instance, the possibility of judgment.  
 
Arendt has a specific sense of judgment. It arises from her 
engagement with both Aristotle and Kant. She argues the following: 
 
Judgment, and especially the judgments of taste, always reflect upon 
others and their taste, take their possible judgments into account. 
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This is necessary because I am human and cannot live outside the 
company of men. I judge as a member of this community and not as a 
member of a supersensible world.43 
 
While the subject position is correct insofar as she names the worldliness of 
subjectivity, and thus there is the recognition that justice must be a quality 
of this world, it does not follow that the criteria of judgement are 
themselves worldly in the same way. The contention is that what is 
necessitated is a realm of transcendence. Transcendence describes the right 
that precedes the having of rights. Once it can be argued that this ‘right’ is 
commensurate with human dignity. The question to be taken up is how the 
non-necessity of its actualization is to be understood. Arendt demands that 
the unconditioned be thought. That is the predicament of thought itself. 
 
 
3 
 
There is, in Aristotle, an already present recognition of the position 
in which a demand for judgment is linked to the transcendent or the 
immanent understood in terms of a both potentiality and the unconditioned, 
both of which are present in their separation from the actual. While a full 
account of the problem would necessitate locating this setup within the 
context created by the sustained treatment of potentiality in Metaphysics 
Θ, if only then to engage critically with that treatment, for these concerns 
in can be identified as at work in the account of ‘political justice’ in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. It is essential to be clear here. This is not to argue that 
the account of ‘political justice’ deploys the distinction between 
potentiality and actuality in any direct sense. Let alone that it establishes a 
connection or affinity between potentiality and the unconditioned. Rather, 
the claim is going to be that the nature of the difference within the realm 
of political justice between physis and nomos necessitates a reworking the 
potential/actual distinction in terms of a founding breach whose 
constitutive elements, in both their ontological as well as their temporal 
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determinations, pertain at-the-same-time and that all these individual 
elements would be necessary to account as much for the viability of the 
position as it would for tracing its implications. Aristotle’s formulation is the 
following:   
 
Political justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. 
A rule of justice is natural that has the same force everywhere [τοῦ 
δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν 
τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν].44 
 
The interpretive problem with which a start can be made concerns how the 
contrast between physis and nomos is to be understood. There is a genuine 
issue here, especially as there will be an enactment of justice on the level 
of nomos that is informed by physis rather than mere ‘convention.’ While 
there may be uses of physis that appear to operate within a modern 
opposition between ‘nature’ and ‘culture,’ the argument here is that such 
an interpolation is for the most part anachronistic. More significantly, 
however, such an interpolation would nullify the philosophical force 
inherent within the physis/nomos relation. What physis means in these 
instances is linked to the propriety of being. Hence the claim that has 
already been made, namely, that in the Politics the use of the term physis, 
in identifying human being as a polis dwelling animal – in other words, as 
having a life that is defined by the polis as place, what has been called 
being-in-place, a life that is always already with others – does not name a 
contingent predicate of human being. On the contrary, the claim is that 
being-in-place is intrinsic to the being of being human. It is this intrinsic 
quality that is identified and named by the term ‘physis.’ A similar form of 
argumentation occurs in the passage that has already been cited above from 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Here, again, the claim is that the distinction 
between physis and nomos is not a simple opposition. Indeed, the contrary 
is the case. As an opposition not only are two distinct ontological realms 
identified, the opposition has an operative and thus workful presence 
because it is temporalized in advance. It needs be understood, to deploy 
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Aristotle’s own vocabulary, in terms of a sustained distinction between the 
‘immutable’ (ἀκίνητον) and the ‘variable.’ The ‘immutable’ (ἀκίνητον), as 
that which is located in its opposition to the ‘mutable,’ has an ontological 
as well as a complex temporal determination. Intrinsic being is counter 
posed here to simple contingency and both pertain in their difference at-
the-same-time.  
 
 Once the nature of these oppositions is settled another set of 
concerns arises. The issues that have to be taken up involve having to work 
with the recognition that the content of the ‘conventional’ (in this context 
the conventional can be identified with normativity) is not arbitrary even 
though is not fixed. Indeed, there can be both a contextual analysis as well 
as a history of nomoi. Nomoi are subject to diachronic as well synchronic 
divergence. In other words, on the level of nomoi there can be conflict 
between two sets of laws or that one set of laws is open both to 
modification if not amelioration. In other words, nomoi in terms of the 
conventional are mutable.45 Mutability therefore names the conditioned.  
This is the domain of the pragmatic. Were the force of law to be delimited 
by this domain, and if this domain were then taken as an end in itself, then 
law’s force would have been radically restricted. Equally, the possibility of 
judgment would have been severely delimited. It would have been limited 
by a specific form of judgment, i.e. one whose conditions of possibility 
would be restricted to law’s and thus justice’s own pragmatic 
determination. With that determination not only would judgment and 
normativity coincide, law would be coercive in that it would have been 
equated with justice. Such an equation would be immediate. Moreover, this 
is the sense of immediacy whose overcoming signals both the separation of 
law from justice and the reciprocally allowing justice to emerge as the 
ground in relation to which law itself can be judged. Again judgment’s 
condition of possibility is located in the breach between law and justice. 
This is the position that has to be pursued.  
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Standing opposed to the pragmatic is therefore another 
understanding of the force of law.46 And here it is of fundamental 
importance to note Aristotle’s use of the term dynamis. It names force. 
That which is ‘immutable’ has force. The condition of its having force is its 
immutability and thus the necessity of its separation from the domain of 
contingent actuality; the latter is the locus of the actual in its opposition to 
the setting named here as physis. The latter’s actualization occurs as much 
in specific, local acts of judgment as it does in maintaining itself as held 
apart from the actual in terms of the yet-to-be determined quality of 
justice. A question arises here. It involves the formal problem of how the 
relation between the immutable and the mutable (the unconditioned and 
the conditioned) is to be understood. This is a speculative question, since it 
concerns the relation between these two domains. Moreover, it is a question 
that allows for the limit of Aristotle’s thinking to be established insofar as 
the answer is always going to be that once content is given to that which is 
essential to ‘political justice’ - where the essential is understood both in 
terms of its immutability and the universality of its ‘force’ - then what 
occurs is the problem of moving from that which has unconditioned force to 
that which is inherently conditioned from the start. In other words, the 
structure in which ‘political justice’ is located stages, once again, the 
problem of moving from physis to nomos – recast now in terms of 
potentiality and actuality – such that the movement has to be understood as 
that actualization of the unconditioned which forms and is formed by the 
occurrence of indetermination. ‘Self-sufficiency’ would undo the possibility 
of physis functioning as a ground of judgment and yet, to return to the 
details of Aristotle’s earlier formulations, the impossible possibility of ‘self-
sufficiency’ means that it continues to create the setting that in the first 
place delimits the force of Aristotle and, in the second, opens both the way 
to Arendt and the emergence of the questions to which her thinking is 
constrained to respond. This is the predicament of her thought. 
 
 In the final lines of the Nicomachean Ethics, as a prelude to the 
identification of the necessity of writing a politics, Aristotle suggests that 
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what would have taken place once a treatise on the political had been 
written is that it would “bring to an end the philosophy of human affairs [ἡ 
περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ]” and therefore a philosophical 
anthropology would have been accomplished.47 The contention here, 
perhaps also as a conclusion, is that it is in light of this formulation that 
what endures as central to an understanding of the being of being human 
emerges with greater clarity. While there is an opposition between the bios 
politikos and the bios theoretikos, in this instance not only will the former 
be privileged; the claim is that it is this sense of life that accords with 
‘human affairs’ and in addition accords with the centrality that has been 
attributed to both being-in-place and being-in-common. More significantly, 
however, the bios politikos brings the centrality of relationality into play. 
As such the bios politikos names what has been identified as the ‘inter.’ In 
other words, it names the necessity to think relationality rather than simply 
assume its presence. As a result there is the need to stage a form of 
connection between what has already been approached in terms of 
thought’s predicament and the primacy of relationality. Thinking 
relationality within the predicament bequeathed by Arendt is to approach it 
in terms of what is implicit in Aristotle even though that implicit quality 
remained unnoticed. A limit was established. The limit emerged once the 
impossibility of self-sufficiency was linked to the recognition that subject 
positions were produced. The state of being a eudaimon and thus the 
generalised state of eudaimonia were after-effects that were themselves 
predicated on maintaining the slave as alive but not participating in life. In 
other words, that the non-relation to the slave and the slave’s non-relation 
to ‘life’ created the conditions in which the move from life to ‘the good 
life’ or from praxis to eupraxia were always developments and therefore 
continuous processes without beginnings.  
The slave’s actions and thus the slave’s life were held in place; the 
place that was not, and more emphatically could never be, being-in-place. 
Were the slave to move from life to ‘the good life,’ that move’s condition of 
possibility would entail a cessation of the place of the slave. Hence the 
move from life to ‘the good life’ would entail that the actualization of a 
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potentiality would have necessitated a rupture and thus a necessary undoing 
of the temporality of at-the-same-timeness that secured Aristotle's 
conception of the relation between life and ‘the good life.’ (The slave 
would have had this potentiality in virtue of being human.)  There would 
need to have been a beginning or a revolution that occasioned the slave’s 
participation in life and thus a reconfiguration of the political in terms of 
another politics of time.48 If there is to be a return to the problem of 
authority then it has to be positioned in relation to the unbinding that 
constitutes the problem. Authority can only be recovered if it is recognised 
as immanent in the being of being human. The unbinding is naturalized and 
thus understood as the norm in which normativity takes the place of 
authority. What has to occur therefore is another unbinding in which the 
place of a gradual evolution from ‘life’ to ‘the good life’ is undone in the 
name of a disjunctive relation between these two forms of life – an 
unbinding that involves the effective presence of the distinction between 
potentiality and actuality. The political, thought philosophically, operates 
within the setting that this distinction sustains.  Moreover, this setup is 
itself informed by a philosophical anthropology in which what is proper to 
the being of being human is named in advance as being-in-place and being-
in-common. As has already been argued what the immanent presence of 
these two modalities provides is the ground and thus the possibility for 
judgement.  Aristotle and Arendt both gesture towards the necessity of this 
other unbinding; the unbinding that founds. An unbinding whose necessity 
forms and informs thought’s predicament, the predicament that limits the 
writings of Aristotle and Arendt and delimits their authority. 
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